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ABSTRACT
Islamic banks are exposed to a unique risk such as Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR). DCR arises from 
the assets managed on behalf of the investment account holders which may be borne by the Islamic bank’s own 
capital, when the Islamic banks forgo part or all of its share of profits on the investment account holders funds, 
in order to increase the return to the investment account holders. In a dual banking system, DCR could be a 
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INTRODUCTION
This study aims to examine the determinant 
of displaced commercial risk to the Islamic banks 
in Malaysia. DCR refers to the risk arising from the 
assets managed on behalf of the investment account 
holders which is transferred to the Islamic banking 
institutions’ own capital where the Islamic banking 
institutions forgo part or all of its portion of profits 
on Profit Sharing Investments Accounts, in order 
to increase the rate of return that would otherwise 
be payable to the investment account holders. 
Technically, if customers choose Islamic banks purely 
on religious motivation, DCR should not be a concern 
since they would not withdraw their deposits from the 
Islamic banks due to lower return compared to the 
conventional banks.  
However, the development of the Islamic banking 
in Malaysia suggest the possibility of displaced 
commercial risk to exist within the Islamic banking 
system. Firstly, the Malaysian banking system is based 
on parallel or dual banking system, which allows 
interest-based and interest-free banking to coexist and 
compete for deposits and financing. As the Malaysians 
are multi-religious and multi-cultural, Islamic banking 
is therefore expected to deal with situations in which 
the demand for and supply of excess funds are no 
longer made on the basis of faith alone but also on 
factors such as return on deposits, cost of financing 
and convenience. The religious and non-religious 
elements in the market segment of the Malaysian 
Islamic banking is likely to affect performance as 
changes in market interest rates are likely to affect 
Islamic bankers’ asset-liability management strategy, 
as well as depositors’ behaviour.
The Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 2012 
exposed, since 2000 to 2012 (BNM, 2012), the Islamic 
banks have successfully expanded their operations by 
attracting more customers, the non-Muslims included. 
This implies that Islamic banks customers are no 
longer limited to those whose motivation is religious 
per se. This translates into the probability that these 
customers are highly profit oriented, hence there 
is also a high tendency for them to withdraw their 
deposits should the return from Islamic banks are not 
par to the conventional ones.  Given this situation, 
there is a higher probability of Islamic banks facing 
Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR).
Moreover, studies show that banks’ customers’ 
motivation for choosing a bank is not at all related to 
religious factor. For instance, Marimuthu et al. (2010) 
and Amin et al. (2011) conduct studies on the loyalty of 
Muslim and non-Muslim customers in the Malaysian 
Islamic banks. Both studies claim that, customers are 
concerned with three major attributes that ultimately 
affect their switching behaviours, which are better 
service provided by bank competitors; higher profit 
provided by other banks; and the variety of products 
and services. In addition, Mulyani (1998) finds that in 
Indonesia, people choose Islamic banks not so much 
because of religious, instead profits hold an important 
role in bank selection process.
Another set of studies (Haron and Shanmugam, 
1995; Haron and Ahmad, 2000; Mangkuto, 2004; 
Sukmana and Yusof, 2005; Yusof et al., 2009; 
Leong et al., 2009; Mohamad Zaid et al., 2011; Abduh 
et al., 2011; Zeitun, 2012) that  examine the savings 
motive of Islamic banks customers, also observe 
the existence of profit motive among the Islamic 
bank’s customers. The existence of profit motive has 
many implications, one of which is the tendency of 
depositors to withdraw their fund and remove it to 
conventional bank if the latter offers higher return 
(interest rates). 
More importantly, Zainol and Kasim (2010) and 
Bacha (2004) find that changes in Islamic banks’ total 
deposits depend on the level of conventional banks’ 
interest rate; and there is a significant relationship 
between conventional banks’ interest rate and Islamic 
banks’ total deposits. This suggests the existence of 
deposit switching from Islamic banks to conventional 
banks when the conventional banks’ interest rate 
increases. The evidence is more direct in highlighting 
the possibility of DCR to be a threat to the Islamic 
banks since it proves that deposit transfer did exist 
when there is an increase in conventional banks’ 
interest rate.
Collectively, those findings suggest that Islamic 
banks in Malaysia possibly face the threat of DCR, 
which is the tendency of Islamic banks depositors 
to withdraw their fund and transfer the fund to 
conventional banks when the real return provided by 
the Islamic bank is lower that the interest rate of its 
conventional counterparts (and vice versa). However, 
to the best of our knowledge, studies on DCR and 
its significance to the Islamic banks is very limited. 
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Hence, this study is undertaken to empirically examine 
to seek the determinant of DCR in Malaysian Islamic 
banks.
The next section presents a detail explanation 
on the core concept, which is Displaced Commercial 
Risk. The research data and methodology is covered 
in Section 3. The empirical results and conclusion are 
presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR)
According by previous authors (Rosly and Zaini, 
2008; Sundararajan, 2008; and How et al., 2005), the 
Islamic banks should consider in displaced commercial 
risk because this problem occurs due to competitive 
pressures on bank to attract and retain investors (fund 
providers). In fact that, the Islamic banks as mudarib 
may forgo a proportion of its income from assets 
funded by the profit sharing investment account 
and apportion its share to the Investment Account 
Holders (fund provider). Toumi (2010) who extended 
previous author’s work, he found that the displaced 
commercial risk is an unexpected loss that the bank 
is able to absorb to ensure that Investment Account 
Holders (IAH) is remunerated at a competitive rate. 
Displaced commercial risk also indicates that 
the Islamic bank may not be able to pay competitive 
rates of returns as compared to other competitors. 
In such situations, this risk arises when an Islamic 
bank underperforms during a period and is unable 
to generate adequate profits to pay its investors and 
depositors a rate of return higher than what should 
be payable under the actual terms of the investment 
contract (AAOIFI, 1999; Khan and Ahmed, 2001; 
Van Hennie and Iqbal, 2008). The reasons for this 
are quite clear in the Islamic bank environment. If 
bank does not provide competitive rates similar on 
deposits, then investment account holders will move 
their funds to a bank (Islamic or otherwise) that is 
able to pay better rates. 
Therefore, most of Islamic banks decide to waive 
their profit portion to pay the investment account 
holders (IAHs) in order to prevent the withdrawal of 
the investment account holders. An Islamic bank is 
strongly exposed to massive withdrawal risk due to 
lower rate of return on investments deposits, which 
explains the logic of increasing the profits distributed 
to IAHs (Khan and Ahmed, 2001; Ahmed, 2003; 
IFSB, 2005; El-Hawary et al., 2007). Once it occurs 
and cannot be handled properly, Islamic banks may 
go bankrupt or at least be taken over by government 
(banking authority). To prevent withdrawal from 
their depositors, the owners of the bank will need 
to apportion part of their own share in profits to the 
investment depositors. As a result, some Islamic 
banks give minimum guaranteed returns to depositors, 
although it is prohibited by the shariah principles 
(AAOIFI, 1999; Warde, 2000)
Thus, Archer and Karim (2006) argue that DCR 
is potentially an efficient and value creating means 
of sharing risks between two classes of investor 
with different risk diversification capabilities and 
preferences. Therefore, Islamic banks set up two 
standards of practices reserves with the intention 
to overcome DCR and attract investment account 
holders. According to Greuning and Iqbal (2007), 
Islamic banks introduce Profit Equalization Reserve 
(PER) and Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) to compete 
with conventional banking industry, it is a shield used 
by Islamic banks to protect DCR. Besides that, Central 
Bank of Malaysia (BNM, 2004) issued Framework 
of Rate of Return to aid Islamic banking sector to 
mitigate risk of income destruction by sustaining 
comparable rates of return for fund depositors.
It means that DCR is related to the fact that Islamic 
banks may find themselves under pressure to smooth 
the rate of return of the Profit Sharing Investments 
Accounts (PSIA) in order to remain competitive and 
not lose customers. In addition, the actual return of 
PSIA would be subsidized by shareholders’ profits 
(Christos & Alexandros, 2009). 
Further, the issues of DCR arise as a result of 
the risk characteristics of profit-sharing investment 
accounts (PSIA). PSIA were designed to achieve 
equitable sharing of risk, which is one of the 
principles of Islamic finance. The characteristics of 
PSIA in Islamic banks could vary among banks and 
jurisdictions, from being deposit-like products (fixed 
return, capital certain, all risks borne by shareholders) 
in some, to being investment-like products (variable 
return, bearing the risk of losses in underlying 
investments) in others. These depend on the extent 
of the balance sheet risks transferred from investment 
account holders to shareholders through various 
techniques available to Islamic banks’ management.
Unlike conventional banks’ deposits, contractual 
relationship between Islamic banks and investment 
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account holders, for example the PSIA holders, 
called mudarabah, is based on the concept of profit 
and loss sharing. In this system, investment account 
holders do not have the same rights as depositors 
or shareholders, but they are required to absorb any 
losses on assets, except the cases of negligence or 
misconduct by the bank. The risk due to the loss of 
competitiveness, caused by PSIA is called DCR. In 
the case of increasing PSIA share in banks’ liabilities, 
can expose the bank to higher DCR, which refers to 
unexpected losses that the bank is able to absorb to 
ensure that IAH are remunerated at a competitive rate, 
especially if this increase is associated with greater 
risk-taking. 
In Islamic banks, the target market is likely to be 
sensitive to market based price measures, particularly 
if these banks operate in competitive contractual 
environments with other Islamic and conventional 
banks and deposit taking institutions. As a result, 
Islamic banks may be pressured in varying degrees 
to provide distributions similar to other institutions 
or risk losing their depositor base. This risk has been 
termed displaced commercial risk. It essentially refers 
to the risk that investors will withdraw their funds 
in droves, thereby subjecting the bank to failure, if 
the returns paid demonstrate a trend contrary to the 
investors’ expectations of deposits of a similar nature. 
Particularly, in this section we focus on the 
concept of DCR which is applicable in Islamic banks. 
There is ample evidence that Islamic banks forbid 
to take any interest related income and thus makes 
deposits from depositors as an important source of 
fund for its operational and financing. Therefore, in 
Islamic banks carry the risk that the bank may confront 
commercial pressure to pay returns that exceed 
the rate that has been earned on its assets financed 
by investment account holders. The bank foregoes 
part or its entire share of profit in order to retain its 
fund providers and dissuade them from withdrawing 
their funds. Thus, we are motivated to examine the 
determinants of DCR.
METHOD
This research will use a sample of 17 full-fledged 
Islamic banks in Malaysia. The study periods span 
from 1994 to 2012, using a balanced panel data. Our 
calculations are based on individual bank data drawn 
from the available annual report database.
Determinant Factors of Displaced Commercial 
Risk
In determining the factors influencing the 
displaced commercial risk among the Islamic banks, 
in line with the earlier studies, four variables are being 
considered: Investment Account Holders Funds, 
Islamic Deposit, Rate of Return, and Interest Rate.
Specifically, the study focuses on the following 
formula: 
DCR = f (FIAH, DIB, RRI, IR)
Where DCR is the displaced commercial risk, 
FIAH is the investment account holders funds, DIB is 
the deposit in Islamic banks, RRI is the rate of return 
Islamic, and IR is the interest rate.
A linear equation, relating the DCR measures to 
a variety of indicators is specified. The determinant 
model can be specified as follow:
DCRi, t = φ0i + φ1FIAHi, t + φ2DIBi, t + φ3RRIi, t + φ4IRi, t 
+ mi, t        (1)
Where the dependent variable is the DCR 
is displaced commercial risk for bank i at time t. 
Whereas, the independent variables are: FIAH is the 
Investment account holders funds; the DIB is total 
deposits of a bank; RRI is the Islamic rate of return; 
IR is the interest rate ratios and µ is an error term for 
bank. 
The Funds of Investment Account Holders (FIAH)
FIAH refers to a customer funds with an 
investment account maintained at an Islamic banks. 
Under the Mudarabah contract, the investment 
account holders agree to participate as rabbul-mal 
and Islamic banks itself as Mudarib. As property 
owner, investment account holders are responsible 
to endure the losses arising from the assets funded, 
except for the case of fraud, misconduct, negligence, 
or rupture of contract terms and conditions by the 
Islamic banks. The investment account holders thus 
endure the commercial risk associated with the assets 
funded by the funds provided by them. At the same 
time, the Islamic banks are responsible for managing 
the investment of assets and are under a fiduciary 
obligation to safeguard the interests of the investment 
account holders via the establishment of rigorous and 
prudent policies in the administration of the assets 
financed by investment account holders. 
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However, Islamic banks are faced with a problem 
while managing FIAH. Most of the problems have 
been the limited availability of shariah compliant 
instruments for managing liquidity, the absence of a 
shariah compliant interbank money market, and a few 
of a shariah compliant lender provided by the central 
bank. 
At this situation, in the returns earned on its 
FIAH being uncompetitive compared to those being 
offered by its competitors, whether Islamic banks or 
conventional institutions. In such a circumstances 
FIAH exposes the Islamic banks to DCR.  
Put formally, in formula of profit distributed to 
investment account holders (PIAH) is calculated for the 
given bank, such as:
PIAH = PA + PPER,IRR + PS
Where PA is represent the actual profit generated 
by assets funded by investment account holders during 
a year. PPER,IRR is the profit from PER and IRR. PS or 
PSmooth is the profit transferred from shareholders (part 
of mudarib’s share and/or hibah from shareholders). 
The relationship between FIAH and DCR occurred 
when the Islamic banks may have invested FIAH into 
relatively longmaturity assets such as long maturity 
Murabahah, Murabahah for the purchase orderer, 
Ijarah or Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek, and thereby have 
locked in lower rates of return on assets than those 
currently on offer in the market. DCR results when 
there is pressure on the Islamic banks to match the 
market expectations of investment account holders. As 
a result, DCR will increase in the Islamic bank. Hence, 
the FIAH responds positively to the DCR.
The Total of Deposits in Islamic Banks (DIB) 
Islamic banks are dependent on depositor’s 
money as a source of funds. According to the 
Keynesian theory of demand for money, there are three 
main motives why people hold money: transactions, 
protective and investment. In order to cater for 
these motives, Islamic banks offer three categories 
of deposit facilities that are demand, savings and 
investment deposits. Demand deposit facility is 
most commonly referred to as current account and is 
designed for those who need money for transaction 
purposes. This motive can be looked at from the point 
of view of consumers who want income to meet their 
household expenditure and from the viewpoint of 
businessmen who require money and want to hold it 
in order to carry on their business. Hence, the purpose 
of deposit facility is for convenience or for making 
daily commitments. The second category of deposit 
is the savings account, which caters the need of those 
who wishes to save money but at the same time want 
to earn an income. Depositors of savings account 
hold money because of protective motives while are 
simultaneously induced by their investment motives. 
Protective motives for holding money refer to the 
desire of people to hold cash balances for unforeseen 
contingencies. The final category of deposit facility is 
investment deposits. Such facility is offered by banks 
to cater for the investment motives of customers who 
normally have idle funds and are looking for better 
returns on their money.
The Islamic Rate of Return (RRI)
The Islamic banks could also be exposed to rate 
of return (RRI) as founded by the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB, 2005). RRI refer to a standard 
of Islamic bank return to addressing the information 
asymmetry between Islamic banks and the depositors 
by enhancing the level of transparency and ensuring 
that depositors would receive fair returns on their 
investment. 
However, RRI differs from interest rate in that 
Islamic banks are concerned with the result of their 
investment activities at the end of the investment 
holding period. This rate is a major concern of 
Islamic banks connected with the investment holding 
period and it happens as a result of Islamic banks’ 
investment activities. It is not possible for the 
Islamic banks to determine in advance the results of 
investment in terms of its profitability (Ismail, 2010). 
According to Iqbal and Greuning (2008), the RRI 
is different from the interest rate in two ways. First, 
since Islamic banks have a mix of mark-up based and 
equity based investments, there is higher uncertainty 
in the RRI earned on investments compared to banks 
which operate on interest based whereby there are 
fixed income securities on the assets side. Second, 
the return on deposits in conventional banks is 
predetermined, while the return on deposits in Islamic 
banks is anticipated but not agreed earlier.
A consequence of the RRI is the DCR which 
involves the transfer of risk associated with deposits 
to equity holders. DCR implies that the bank 
may operate in full compliance with the shariah 
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requirements, may not be able to pay competitive 
RRI as compared to its peers and other competitors. 
Islamic banks may be under market pressure to pay 
a return that exceeds the rate that has been earned on 
assets financed by depositor when the return on assets 
is under-performing as compared with competitors’ 
rates. Islamic banks may decide to waive their rights 
to part or their entire Muarib share of profits in order 
to satisfy and retain their fund providers and dissuade 
them from withdrawing their funds.
The Conventional Interest Rates (IR)
In a dual banking system where the Islamic 
banking system operates in parallel with the 
conventional system. Changes in the IR put pressure 
on the Islamic banks system. Consequently, the 
Islamic banks are exposed to the IR movements 
similar to the conventional counterparts since the 
rate of return in the Islamic banks is sensitive to the 
changes in the IR.
According to How et al. (2005), IR should be a 
concern to the Islamic banks, particularly in a dual 
banking system such as in Malaysia. This is because 
misunderstanding that the Islamic banks are not using 
IR in their transaction. So they are not exposed to IR. 
Unlike conventional banks that have more flexibility 
on the asset side, meanwhile Islamic banks have the 
fixed rate assets that not sensitive to the interest rate 
changes but in the liability side are sensitive to IR 
changes. Similarly, Kasri and Kassim (2009) find 
that the IR is one of the major determinants of saving 
in the Islamic banks. Furthermore, the tendency of 
Islamic banks are exposed of DCR are very high.
Since IR will be effect on the existence of DCR, 
we need to be considering the relationship between 
interest rates (IR) with DCR. The existing literature 
shows that the IR can influence banks’ risk activities 
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Rajan, 2006; Borio 
and Zhu, 2008; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni 
and Peydro, 2011). Typically, in a positive side, 
Islamic banks have a higher risk taking when IR are 
higher. However, in a negative side, IR levels can 
influence the ability of borrowers to repay (Jarrow 
and Turnbull, 2000; Carling et al., 2007; Alessandri 
and Drehmann, 2010; Drehmann, Sorensen, and 
Stringa, 2010) at higher levels the incentive to default 
(moral hazard) increases. 
 Table 1. shows summarizes the variables utilized 
in the estimations. It follows with the hypotheses and 
expected coefficients.
RESULTS
Descriptive analysis was conducted to observe 
the statistical properties of the data used as variables, 
such as the mean, median, standard deviation and 
normality of the data. Mean refers to the average 
value of each variable in the study sample. Median is 
the middle value of the data when it has been arranged 
in ascending, while standard deviation shows the data 
dispersion or variation from the mean value. Table 1. 
illustrates the summary of basic descriptive statistics 
of the variables involved in the model developed.
In measuring skewness, it is found that the 
bank characteristic variables, which consist of the 
investment account holders’ funds (FIAH) and the 
displaced commercial risk (DCR), deposit in Islamic 
banks (DIB) and the interest rate (IR) were positively 
scattered. 
Next, kurtosis tests were carried out to observe 
the normality of the data distribution. Based on this 
output, only the displaced commercial risk’ values are 
approaching two, meeting the criteria for a normally 
distributed data.
Jarque-Bera test is then used to confirm the extent 
of the data normality distribution. From this test, 
results in Table 2. demonstrate that all variables are 
significant. This shows that all data are not normally 
distributed. Therefore, ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimation is not compatible with the research data. 
Hence, the Generalized Least Square (GLS) method 
is more appropriate and expected to yield a much 
better result.
Table 3. shows the correlation matrix for the 
independent variables. Based on the correlation 
table, it seems that all independent variables have 
significant correlation with displaced commercial 
risk variable. Most of the variables are correlated but 
not beyond the critical threshold of multicollinearity. 
All correlation results are below 0.6 for each pair of 
variables, which indicates that multicollinearity is not 
a potential problem.
To ensure that the factors influencing the displaced 
commercial risk was indeed accurate to measure all 
the construct variables for determinant of displaced 
commercial risk, Significance Test in Stata SE 10 was 
performed to test for the validity of instruments. It 
also should be noted that the particular variables used 
in this study have already been tested as literature 
demonstrates, which provide adhoc validity. 
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Variables Description Hypotheses Proxy Expected Coefficients Author
Dependent Variable
DCR Unexpected loss to 
shareholders when PSIA are 
treated as being in between 
pure investment and 
deposit-like products
minus
Unexpected loss to 
shareholders when PSIA are 
treated as pure investment 
products
IAHs as rational decision 
makers might decide to 
withdraw the deposits if 
rate of return is lower. 
Risk Factor Htay and Salman (2013)
Independent Variable
FIAH The funds of Investment 
Account Holders 
There is a positive 
relationship between DCR 
and FIAH in Malaysian 
Islamic banks.
Profit 
distribution
+ Sundararajan (2008); Archer 
& Rifaat (2006, 2007); 
Sundararajan (2007); 
DIP The total deposits There is a negative 
relationship between 
DCR and DEP in Malaysian 
Islamic banks.
Saving 
funds
- Bacha (2004); Haron and 
Ahmad (2000); 
Kasri and Kassim (2009); 
Haron and Shanmugam 
(1995);
Hutapea and Kasri (2010).
RRI The Islamic rate of return There is a negative 
relationship between 
DCR and RRI in Malaysian 
Islamic banks.
Benchmark 
rates
- IFSB (2005); 
Iqbal and Greuning (2008);
Ismail (2010);
IR The Conventional Interest 
rate 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
DCR and INT in Malaysian 
Islamic banks.
Subjected 
to negative 
fund gap
+ Ergec and Arslan (2011);
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 
(2006); 
Rajan (2006); Borio and Zhu 
(2008); 
Delis and Kouretas (2011); 
Maddaloni and Peydro 
(2011).
Table 1. Description of The Variables
 Note: * Significant at 1%, ** 5%, and*** 10%
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
DCR 2.5115 0.9024 2.7508 0.6860 2.0427 17.7260***
FIAH 3.9850 4.6921 1.8423 -1.3548 3.4266 47.6543***
DIB 1.9301 0.0000 2.3478 0.5108 1.4354 22.1154***
RRI 1.9305 3.0108 1.6602 -0.2899 1.1226 24.4509***
IR 4.0847 3.2000 1.8163 1.2713 3.2412 41.3153***
Table 2. Descriptive Statistic Variables
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Table 4 shows the outcome of the scores for 
all categories (All, Large and Small banks) are 
completely related between displaced commercial 
risk (DCR) with each independent variables itself are 
significant at the 10 percent.
To separate the displaced commercial risk 
impact of the Islamic nature of a bank from the 
impact of the three group level (all, large and small 
banks categories), we turn to regression analysis. 
We run several specifications. From the descriptive 
statistics analysis output in Table 2, it is shows that 
the Generalized Least Square (GLS) techniques is 
more appropriate and expected to yield a much better 
result. For comparison, we report the three different 
estimations. It has to include GLS with non-effects 
estimation, GLS with fixed effects estimation and 
GLS with random effects estimation.
Table 3. Pearson’s Correlations
Correlation DCR FIAH1 DIB1 RRI IR 
DCR 1.0000
FIAH 0.5960*** 1.0000
DIB -0.1527** 0.4209*** 1.0000
RRI -0.6148*** 0.6215*** 0.3063*** 1.0000
IR 0.4867*** -0.6176*** -0.2441*** -0.6514*** 1.0000
Note: * Significant at 1%, ** 5% and*** 10%.
Table 4. Test of Validity
ALL BANKS LARGE BANKS SMALL BANKS
C -0.5507 -0.4109 -1.3111
(0.2285)*** (0.2617)** (0.4861)***
FIAH 0.8158 0.7691 1.0470
(0.0538)*** (0.0600)*** (0.1225)***
Note: * Significant at 1%, ** 5% and*** 10%.
ALL BANKS LARGE BANKS SMALL BANKS
C 1.9409 1.7716 2.3112
(0.1923)*** (0.2367)*** (0.3305)***
DIB -0.2427 -0.2853 -0.1070
(0.0608)*** (0.0693)*** (0.1349)***
Note: * Significant at 1%, ** 5% and*** 10%.
ALL BANKS LARGE BANKS SMALL BANKS
C 1.9409 1.7716 2.3112
(0.1923)*** (0.2367)*** (0.3305)***
DIB -0.2427 -0.2853 -0.1070
(0.0608)*** (0.0693)*** (0.1349)***
Note: * Significant at 1%, ** 5% and*** 10%.
ALL BANKS LARGE BANKS SMALL BANKS
C 5.3510 5.3044 5.4627
(0.3404)*** (0.4170)*** (0.5877)***
IR 0.7200 0.7134 0.7358
(0.0762)*** (0.0933)*** (0.1315)***
Note: * Significant at 1%, ** 5% and*** 10%.
ALL BANKS LARGE BANKS SMALL BANKS
C 0.1663 0.1469 0.2129
(0.1738)*** (0.2149)** (0.2915)***
RRI -1.1622 -1.1620 -1.1626
(0.0684)*** (0.0845)*** (0.1146)***
Note: * Significant at 1%, ** 5% and*** 10%.
The regression result of displaced commercial risk 
has been identified as the dependent variable as a proxy 
of measuring risk shown in Table 5. The diagnostics 
test statistics show no evidence of misspecification, 
no serial correlation, no multicollinearity and no 
heterokedasticity. The p-value reported for the Chow 
test statistic is 0.0000. A low p-value suggests that 
we are able to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, 
we choose the fixed effect model. However, the best 
model is selected based on the Hausman test is to 
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Next, standard deviation is used in determining 
the variation of the data. DCR and DIB variables 
have the highest standard deviation value of 
2.7508 and 2.3478 respectively. This shows that 
the Islamic banking involved in the research do not 
consistently perform well in their deposit funds and 
also Islamic bank depositors expect Islamic banks to 
pay competitive returns and provide comprehensive 
banking services (rational behaviors).
Variables DIB and RRI have significantly 
strong negative values with displaced commercial 
risk indicating that the greater amount of the rate of 
return Islamic and the deposit in Islamic banks, the 
lesser their amount of DCR (Table 3). Another result 
prove that validity coefficient for these two variables 
DCR (displaced commercial risk) and the investment 
account holders’ funds (FIAH); displaced commercial 
risk (DCR) and deposit in Islamic banks (DIB); 
displaced commercial risk (DCR) and the rate of 
return Islamic (RRI); and also displaced commercial 
risk (DCR) and the interest rate (IR) are significant.
DCR and FIAH
From the research result show that FIAH respond 
positively to the DCR. There is a positive relationship 
between DCR and FIAH in Malaysian Islamic banks. 
When the Islamic banks may have invested FIAH into 
relatively long maturity assets and thereby have locked 
in lower rates of return on assets than those currently on 
offer in the market. DCR results when there is pressure 
on the Islamic banks to match the market expectations 
of investment account holders. As a result, DCR will 
increase in the Islamic bank (Sundararajan, 2007, 
2008; Archer and Rifaat, 2006, 2007).
Islamic banks need to be practice the type of income 
smoothing for FIAH that gives rise to DCR. Failure to 
smooth FIAH might result of withdrawals of funds by 
investment account holders to place it in other institution 
that gives higher yield, which jeopardize the bank’s 
commercial position. Any attempt by Islamic banks to 
counterpart the market expectation and covering losses 
arising from assets financed by investment funds, may 
expose them to DCR. Disclosure of information on 
policies, procedures and profit allocation basis can 
provide clarity and transparency regarding the rates of 
return and associated risks that are applicable to profit 
sharing investment accounts. The lack of transparency 
such in the financial reporting of Islamic banks means 
that this smoothing process is generally not observable 
in the Islamic banks financial statements (Archer and 
Rifaat, 2006). 
choose between fixed effects or random effects model. 
The output of All and Large banks are reported to be 
chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom and a p-value 
of 0.0586 and 0.0623 respectively. Based on these 
results we would to reject the null hypothesis and 
a fixed effect approach will be preferred. However, 
converse with the Small banks outputs. The output 
of small banks is 0.0083. Based on these results we 
would not to reject the null hypothesis and a random 
effect approach will be preferred. 
The statistical output also shows the result 
heteroskedasticity problem. When we are use the 
Breusch-Pagan test, that the null hypothesis is a 
constant variance. The output shown the p-value is 
0.0001, then we reject the null and there is no problem 
of heteroskedasticity. Based on the output, our results 
show that fixed effect model is better than GLS none 
effect and random effect model. 
Table 5 reported that for the first set of regressions, 
the R-squared for All and Large Islamic banks 
were 58% while Small banks is 61%. These results 
identify that factors that are significant in determining 
displaced commercial risk for Islamic banks are the 
Islamic bank’s investment account holders share, the 
deposit in Islamic banks, the rate of return Islamic, 
and the interest rate.
DISCUSSION
In determining the factors influencing the 
displaced commercial risk among the Islamic banks’ 
customers, in line with the previous chapter, four major 
objective variables are being considered: Investment 
account holder funds, Islamic deposit, rate of return, 
and interest rate (equation 1).
According to Table 1, we can see that the interest 
rate, Islamic bank’s investment account holders 
share, and displaced commercial risk variables 
recorded the highest average value in the data 
distribution with a mean values of 4.0847, 3.9850, 
and 2.5115 respectively, while the deposit in Islamic 
banks, and the rate of return Islamic variables show 
the lowest average value of 1.9301 and 1.9305. The 
higher average for the investment account holders’ 
funds (FIAH), this indicates that investment account 
holders are really concern about shariah-compliant 
investments and any breach committed by bank will 
destroy their trust and motivate them to withdraw their 
funds. While the lower average of deposit in Islamic 
banks (DIB) and the rate of return Islamic (RRI) is 
shown that the way to anticipate DCR.
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ALL BANKS LARGE BANKS SMALL BANKS
Non 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Non 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Non 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
C -1.4968 -1.6518 -1.3952 -1.5330 -1.7257 -1.4090 -1.4218 -1.3778 -1.4218
0.8198** 0.4859*** 0.4720*** 0.6123*** 0.5807*** 0.5686*** 0.9157* 0.9341* 0.9157*
FIAH 0.4934 0.6428 0.5670 0.5466 0.6479 0.5520 0.6249 0.6109 0.6249
0.1161*** 0.0684*** 0.0602*** 0.0726*** 0.0780*** 0.0680*** 0.1460*** 0.1511*** 0.1460***
DIB -0.1798 -0.1521 -0.1415 -0.1566 -0.1348 -0.1213 -0.2089 -0.2030 -0.2089
0.0701*** 0.0492*** 0.0455*** 0.0561*** 0.0582*** 0.0543*** 0.0908*** 0.0949** 0.0908***
RRI -1.0015 -0.8293 -0.8673 -0.8995 -0.8137 -0.8643 -0.8591 -0.8645 -0.8591
0.1275*** 0.0877*** 0.0857*** 0.1096*** 0.1071*** 0.1051*** 0.1533*** 0.1560*** 0.1533***
IR 0.1116 0.1032 0.0848 0.1195 0.1170 0.0939 0.0628 0.0599 0.0628
0.1158* 0.0748* 0.0745* 0.0967* 0.0909* 0.0912* 0.1322* 0.1343** 0.1322*
R2 - 0.5878 0.5895 - 0.5795 0.5824 - 0.6129 0.6130
Hausman Test 
(Test Random vs 
Fixed effects)
6.98
7.21 6.52
Prob 0.0586 0.0623 0.0083
Chow Test (Test 
None vs Fixed 
effects)
4.53
5.96 4.02
Prob 0.0000 0000 0.0000
Breusch-P 
Test (Test the 
Heteroskedasticity 
Problem)
5.71
6.78 4.21
Prob 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note:
Figures in parentheses denote ‘Standard Error’ values of the regressions coefficients.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
Table 5. GLS Estimation Result
To cover losses arising from assets financed by 
investment funds and to smooth rates of return paid 
to the FIAH, Islamic banks developed in practice 
several techniques in order to maintain stable and 
competitive rates to investment depositors. 
The first mechanism consists of smoothing 
returns, using a combination of reserves retained 
from the profits attributed to both investment account 
holders and shareholders (Sundararajan, 2008; 
Archer and Rifaat, 2007; Sundararajan, 2007; Archer 
and Rifaat, 2006). Islamic banks can include a clause 
in the terms of contracts with investment account 
holders giving the right to the bank to retain a certain 
proportion of their profits. Generally, the amount of 
reserves is positively correlated to the rate of return on 
assets (Sundararajan, 2007). The retention of reserves 
is a common practice of the majority of Islamic banks 
(Sundarajan, 2008, Archer and Rifaat, 2006). 
Second, consists of investing a significant part 
of restricted and unrestricted investment accounts in 
215Determinants of Displaced Commercial Risk 
in Islamic Banking Institutions: Malaysia Evidence
assets with certain return and lower risk (short-term 
maturity). This practice generates additional returns 
for shareholders and provides a cushion for Islamic 
banks to facilitate returns smoothing (Archer and 
Rifaat, 2006). 
A third mechanism consists of the variation of 
the percentage of profit taken by Islamic banks as the 
Mudarib Share. In mudarabah contract, mudarib share 
is the percentage of the profits of the Islamic bank as 
a mudarib (fund manager of the investment account). 
The profits are distributed according to a pre agreed 
ratio between the Islamic bank and the investment 
account holders. The percentage of the Mudarib share 
profit predetermined initially is the maximum part, 
while the share distributed actually is liable to vary 
from year to year according to the actual rate of return 
on asset financed by investment accounts (Archer and 
Rifaat, 2006). When reserves are insufficient, Islamic 
banks adjust the Mudarib share, if obliged, and reduce 
it below to the contracted share (Sundararajan, 2008). 
Islamic banks may also transfer some proportion of 
shareholders returns to investment account depositors 
(Sundarajan, 2008). The shareholders decision to 
agree, which is a shariah condition, to give up part 
or all of their profits to increase FIAH means that 
the shareholders accept that the risk attaching to 
the returns of a portfolio of assets financed partly 
or wholly by profit sharing investment accounts is 
displaced, so that is borne largely by themselves (the 
shareholders) (Archer and Rifaat; 2007).
DCR and DIB
There is a negative relationship between DCR 
and DIB in Malaysian Islamic banks. It is showed 
on empirical result of study in Table 5. However, 
from the depositor’s perspective in the case of 
relationship between DIB and DCR are related to 
investment behaviour. The changes in total deposit 
(DIB) influence DCR, amongst the study from Bacha 
(2004); Haron and Ahmad (2000); Kasri and Kassim 
(2009); Haron and Shanmugam (1995); Hutapea and 
Kasri (2010); Abduh (2011); and Ismal (2011) finds 
that there is a strong correlation between DIB and 
DCR. DIB point negative effect on DCR. 
The main plausible justification is due to the 
total Islamic bank deposits tend to decrease regarding 
issues of shariah non-compliance products and 
practices, experiencing lower rate of return and 
receiving rumors on future banking crisis. If these of 
situation happened, on the opposite side, decreasing 
the depositors deposit their money in bank can expose 
the bank to higher DCR. 
DCR and RRI 
The other result of the study show that there is 
a negative relationship between DCR and RRI in 
Malaysian Islamic banks. Some empirical studies 
suggest that negative relationship between RRI and 
DCR (Chong and Liu, 2009; Radiah and Yap, 2009; 
Rahmatina and Salina, 2006; Sundarajan, 2005; 
Bacha, 2004; Rachmawati and Syamsulhakim, 2004; 
Kaleem and Mansoor, 2003; Sudin and Norafifah, 
2000; Haron and Schanmugan, 1995). It happened 
when the Islamic banks invest the funds into long 
maturity assets which may yield lower RRI compared 
to the prevailing market expectations. Therefore, in 
any effort by the Islamic banks to match the market 
expectation are exposed to DCR.
The situation happened where there is a sudden 
rise of market rates, the Islamic banks as a strategy 
to be competitive may decide to increase the RRI 
payable to depositor to prevent potential withdrawal 
of funds. This condition indicates that the Islamic 
banks’ depositor are attracted to higher return and 
guided by the profit motive. In the short run, the 
lower rate of return would not force depositors to 
withdraw funds. But, in the long run, it might result 
to a significant number of depositors who took their 
funds from Islamic banks (Iqbal and Greuning, 2008; 
Ismail, 2010).
DCR and IR
The last result show that there is a positive 
relationship between DCR and IR in Malaysian 
Islamic banks. Islamic banks are more sensitive to the 
changes in interest rates compared to the conventional 
banks. The Islamic banks give a negative response to 
interest rates. Hence, DCR is positively to the interest 
rate (Ergec and Arslan, 2011; Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2006; Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2008; 
Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Maddaloni and Peydro, 
2011).  
In a Islamic deposit market, a change in IR 
influence DCR. It is happened when the IR increase, 
the DCR will be increase. It is possible that Islamic 
bank’s depositor withdrawn their fund and transfer 
it to the conventional banks. Thus, the higher the 
volatility of IR, the bigger the DCR faced by Islamic 
banks such that the banks need to increase their deposit 
rate or to decrease their financing rate or operate at 
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a lower margin (Jarrow and Turnbull, 2000; Carling 
et al., 2007; and Alessandri and Drehmann, 2010; 
Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa, 2010).
CONCLUSION
We can conclude that, basically the Displaced 
Commercial Risk problem should not occur in the 
Islamic banking system if their account holders choose 
Islamic banks due to religious obligatory factor. 
However, the empirical data proven the existing of 
DCR in Islamic banking system in Malaysia because 
of a customer that behaves profit motivated or often 
referred to as a floating client.
Therefore, the main objective of this study was 
to examine the determinant of displaced commercial 
risk to the Islamic banks in Malaysia. Accordingly, 
we found that the Investment Account Holders 
Funds, Islamic Deposit, Islamic Rate of Return, and 
Conventional Interest Rate have a significant impact 
on the displaced commercial risk.
We also run several specifications. From the 
descriptive statistics analysis output, it is shows that 
the Generalized Least Square (GLS) techniques is 
more appropriate and expected to yield a much better 
result. For comparison, we report the three different 
estimations. The best model is selected based on the 
Hausman test. It has to include GLS with non-effects 
estimation, GLS with fixed effects estimation and 
GLS with random effects estimation. 
The diagnostics test statistics show that, we 
choose the fixed effect model for determinant of 
displaced commercial risk and bank performances. 
It is only being happened in All and Large banks 
categories because their focus on more realistically 
and policy relevant the effects of bank characteristics 
on some outcome. Based on this approach, the 
individual variable effects can be examined. However, 
converse with the Small banks results. The random 
effect approach will be preferred.
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